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Abstract--This paper provides a 
simple probability analysis of 
the usefulness of decision aids 
that generate fallible advice . 
The main results are as fol­
lows. The usefulness of a 
decision aid depends heavily on 
the ability of the user to 
identify contexts in which the 
aid (or user unaided) is likely 
to be incorrect. Without this 
ability, attending to (i.e., 
consider, but not always ac­
cept) the advice of a decision 
aid is counterproductive -- the 
decision maker would be better 
off either routinely accepting 
or routinely ignoring the aid's 
advice. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there has been 
a g r o w i n g  interest in the 
development of computer-based 
systems that provide analytical 
s u p p o r t  t o  human decision 
making. The idea of using com­
puters t o  provide decision 
making advice seems to have 
emerged somewhat independently 
from research in three separate 
areas: information systems and 
optimization theory, from which 
the concept of a de cision sup­
po rt system (DSS) seems to have 
emerged (e.g. , Sprague and 
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Carlson, 1982) ; psychological 
and mathematical research in 
judgment and decision (JDM) 
from which the idea of a de ci ­
sion aid emerged (e .g. , Adel­
man, et.al, 1982); and artifi­
c i a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  w h i c h  
spawned the popular notion of 
an expert system (e.g., Hayes­
Roth, et. al., 1983). 
Common to these aiding tradi­
tions is the use of analytic 
techniques that the user is not 
otherwise likely to employ or 
have available t o  recommend 
possible solutions to a deci­
sion problem. This appears to 
reflect a common underlying as­
sumption that in contrast to 
computer systems that onl y  
provide problem-relevant info r­
mation, a computer system that 
also provides good decision 
making advi ce, based on its own 
analysis, is more useful. In 
other words, there is added 
value in performing a separate 
analysis and on that basis 
recommending solutions . 
In this paper we critically ex­
amine this added-value assump­
tion. Using a simple probabil­
ity analysis, we demonstrate 
that it is unwarranted as an 
assumption. Unless special 
measures are taken, it may be 
more reasonable to assume the 
opposite: that there is little 
value added by automatically 
generating advice. Conditions 
under which this result can be 
reversed are then presented. 
In the remainder of this paper, 
we will use the term "decision 
aid" to refer all three types 
of aiding systems. 
2. 0 FALLIBLE VS. INFALLIBLE 
ADVICE 
Modern technology has provided 
humankind with many computer­
driven devices that perform so 
consistently that they are con­
sidered virtually infallible. 
That is, unless something quite 
unusual occurs, the device is 
simply trusted to perform its 
function. In some cases, this 
even applies to systems that 
automate decision making func­
tions. For instance, as long 
as conditions are right (e.g., 
good weather) , a good pilot 
will feel comfortable in relin­
q u i s h i n g  c o n t r o l  t o  a n  
automatic pilot. 
By contrast, decision aids that 
recommend problem solutions are 
g e n e ra l l y  quite f a l l i b l e .  
Indeed, an infallible advisory 
system is almost a contradic­
tion in terms. 
Unfortunately, there appear to 
be some inherent costs as­
sociated with f allibility. To 
illustrate these costs, con­
sider the following scenario. 
A decision maker is given a 
decision aid that is based on 
an algorithm with an accuracy 
rate of 70%; that is, 70% of 
its recommended decisions are, 
by some accepted criteria, cor­
rect. The decision maker when 
unaided has an accuracy rate of 
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60%. Should the decision maker 
attend to the aids advice? The 
answer, of course, depends on 
how that decision maker chooses 
to use the aid. Let us assume 
further that since the aid is 
known to be fallible, the deci­
sion maker wishes to use some 
discretion in heeding the aid's 
advice. The user first con­
siders the aid's advice and 
after some deliberation, will 
accept or reject the advice. 
We assume that the user accepts 
the aid's advice half the time. 
Finally if the user rejects the 
aid's advice, then he or she 
must solve the problem in the 
time remaining; with a reduced 
accuracy rate of, say, 40%. 
Should our decision maker at­
tend t o  the aid s' a d v i c e ?  
Clearly not! As shown in 
Figure 1, the probability of 
generating the correct answer 
drops to .55, even though the 
aid is based on an algorithm 
that performs significantly 
better than the unaided user! 
More generally, using eq. 1 in 
Figure 1, one could charac­
terize the comparison between 
unaided and aided performance 
as shown in Figure 2. As noted 
there, performance increases 
linearly with the probability 
of accepting an aid's advice. 
The usefulness of the advisory 
c omp o n e n t  w ill v a r y  w i t h  
changes in individual parameter 
values, but is in general maxi­
mal when the aid's advice is 
accepted routinely. In short, 
we get a paradoxical result: 
using a decision aid as an aid 
appears to be counterproduc­
tive. 
Since this result may be coun­
terintuitive, let us reconsider 
t h e  p l a u s i b i li t y  of t h i s  
scenario and examine possible 
P(correct l aided) = 
P(advice correct l accept advice)*P(accept aid advice) 
+ P(user correct l reject aid advice)*P(reject aid advice) 
= . 7*. 5 + .4*.5 = .55, 
FIGURE 1 
Accuracy of Decision Maker/Decision Aid Combination: Equ ation [1] 
[P(a j b) is the conditional probability of a given b.] 
objections to eq 1. First it 
may seem implausible that the 
decision maker would excercise 
much discretion in accepting an 
aid's advice when the aid has a 
better hit rate. It seems un­
likely, however, that a deci­
sion maker would simply trans­
fer decision making respon­
sibility to a fallible algo­
rithm even if the user were 
aware of the algorithm's supe­
rior hit rate (Dawes, 1979). 
Second, one might object that 
the process of considering and 
rejecting an aid's advice does 
not simply "use up" some of the 
user's problem-solving time. 
Other compensating benefits are 
provided. For example, examin­
ing an expert system rule trace 
might g i v e  a user partial 
analysis that will facilitate 
later problem solving even if 
the advice is rejected. We 
suggest, however, that although 
some decision aids may offer 
such incidental benefits, there 
is no reason to assume that 
most decision aids will. Also, 
even if there are such problem 
s o l v i n g  b e n e f i t s, t h e s e  
benefits are not necessarily 
attributable to the advisory 
component of the aid. Partial 
analyses and problem relevant 
i n f o r mation can always be 
presented without also recom­
mending solutions. One could 
argue that the user would be 
just as well off if he or she 
used the aid as an information 
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source, but routinely ignored 
the aid's advice . (Actually 
the issue is bit deeper than 
this. Partial analyses can 
also be viewed as advice, lead­
ing to a recursive arguement. 
If certain classes of partial 
analyses are viewed as infal­
lible (i.e. , always trusted) 
then, of course, the user 
should simply accept the par­
tial analysis results. Partial 
analyses that are viewed as 
fallible are subject to the 
same quantitative a n a lysis 
presented here.) 
Third, one might object to the 
assumption, implicit in eq. 1, 
that the user is unable to dis­
criminate correct and incorrect 
advice. Thus, the probability 
of accepting the aid's advice 
is independent of whether or 
not the aid generated good ad­
vice. At first, this assump­
tion might seem unreasonable: 
surely the user is more likely 
to accept good rather than bad 
advice. We suggest, however, 
that unless one has strong 
reasons to believe otherwise, 
this is what should be assumed. 
To suggest otherwise is to 
claim that the less accurate 
problem solver, prior to any 
independent problem solving, is 
able to outperform the more ac­
curate problem solver. (This 
issue is investigated further 
in Section 3.0. ) 
Finally, it should be noted 
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Possible Relationship Between Aided and Unaided Performance 
that, for simplicity, solutions 
are treated as either correct 
or incorrect. This could be 
generalized to domains where 
there are, by some criteria, 
"better" and "worse" solutions. 
The analyses in this paper 
would then remain substantially 
unchanged, whether or not the 
criteria for discriminating 
good from bad solutions is ex­
plicitly known. 
In summary, this analysis sug­
gest two results. First, that 
a decision aid may be most 
beneficial if it is used as an 
a u t o m a t e d  d e c ision m a k e r ,  
rather than as an aid. Second, 
if the user wishes to be care­
ful about when to accept the 
aid's advice, then aided per­
formance may actually be worse 
than unaided performance. Un­
fortunately, these results seem 
to contradict the spirit of 
decision aiding -- to build a 
useful interactive advisory 
system around a good, but fal­
lible, algorithm. 
3.0 OVERCOMING THE COST OF 
FALLIBILITY 
Common sense suggests that "two 
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heads are better than one." 
Despite the analysis of the 
previous section, intuition 
suggests that this maxim should 
applicable to combined decision 
maker/decision aid problem 
solving. Furthermore, it is 
clear that the potential per­
f o r m a n c e  o f  a d e c i s i on 
maker/decision aid combination 
is higher than either problem 
solver independently. In the 
example of the last section, 
for instance, if the aid and 
unaided user are conditionally 
independent in their hit rates, 
then the potential combined hit 
rate is .88 - - the probability 
that at least one of the two 
problem solvers will generate 
the correct answer. Of con­
cern, therefore, is the deter­
mination of the conditions un­
der which this potential can be 
realized. 
Of course, improvements that 
change any of the var i ous 
parameter values in eq. 1 will 
help. But such changes will 
not change the result that per­
formance is maximal when the 
aid is used as an automated 
decision maker. Furthermore, 
improvements in the incidental 
benefits obtained from the 
process of e valuating, but 
rejecting, the aid's advice 
will decrease the added-value 
uniquely attributable to the 
advisory component. 
We suggest instead that a cir­
c u m s t a n c e  w h e r e  t h e  u s e r  
/decision aid combination per­
f o r m s  b e t t er than eithe r 
problem solver independently is 
only realizable if the decision 
maker is discriminating about 
when to accept the aid's ad­
vice. To illustrate why, con­
sider the modification of eq. 1 
shown in Figure 3. In the ex­
ample in Section 2. 0, we as­
sumed that; 
P(accept advice / 
advice correct) = .5 
P(accept advice ! 
advice wrong) = .5 
P(user correct l reject advice 
& advice correct) = .4 
P(user correct l reject advice 
& advice wrong) .4. 
P(advice correct) = .7, 
which resulted in P(correct l 
aided}=. 55. 
Consider now a case where the 
user is somewhat discriminating 
about when to accept/reject the 
aid's advice. For instance, 
P(accept advice j 
advice correct) = . 7  
P(accept advice ! 
advice incorrect) = . 3. 
Now P(correct l aided) = . 66 . A 
m o d e r a t e  a b i l i t y  t o  d i s ­
criminate good from bad advice 
resulted in a moderate improve­
ment in performance, more than 
compensating for the cost of 
evaluating and rejecting the 
aid's advice. (Note that some 
o f  the i m p r o v ement is at­
tributable to the fact that the 
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marginal P(accept advice) has 
a l s o  i n c r e a s e d .  T h i s  i s  
reasonable if the aid is 
usually correct, then a dis­
criminating user would usually 
accept its advice.) 
A more dramatic example is 
where the user is very dis­
criminating about accepting the 
aid's advice, but the aid's hit 
rate is lower than the user. 
For example, 
P(accept advice ! 
advice correct) = .9 
P(accept advice ! 
advice wrong) = .1 
P(advice correct) = . 55. 
We now get P(correct l 
aided) = . 68. 
Another variant is the case 
where the user is a good pre­
dictor o f  h i s  o r  he r own 
capabilities, but does not have 
a good assessment of the aid's. 
This suggests a scenario where 
the user must first problem 
whether to solve the problem 
unaided. If yes, then ignore 
the aid. If not, then accept 
the aid's advice. This variant 
leads to the equation shown in 
Figure 4. 
Assume that the user can pre­
dict his or her own success 70% 
of the time, the probability 
that the aid is correct is in­
dependent of whether or not the 
user would be correct, and (for 
simplicity) that it takes no 
time to decide whether to use 
the aid. We can then plug in 
the following values: 
P(correct l aided) = 
.7*.6 + . 7* . 3 * . 6 + .7*.7*.4 
= .742. 
Finally, users who are dis­
criminating in both ways would 
P(correct l aided) = 
P(accept advice l advice correct)*P(advice correct) 
+ P(user correct l reject advice & advice correct) 
*P(reject advice l advice correct) 
*P(advice correct) 
+ P(user correct J reject advice & advice wrong) 
*P(reject advice l advice wrong)*P(advice wrong). 
FIGURE 3 
Accuracy of Decision Maker /Decision Aid Combination: Equation [2] 
likely perform even better. 
As these quantitative examples 
suggest, significant benefits 
can be obtained by supporting a 
user's ability to be d is­
criminating in his or her use 
of an aid. This suggests that 
a user must know enough about 
an aid's falliblities (or her 
own) to be able to identify 
circumstances when the aid's 
advice (or her own judgment) 
should simply be ignored. Un­
fortunately, and not supris­
ingly, few decision aids are 
designed with the intent of 
helping a user easily identify 
contexts in which the aid is 
l i k e l y  t o  b e  i n co r r e c t. 
Similarly, developers intent on 
transfering an aid to an opera­
tional environment are not 
li k ely to a d v e r tis e th e 
weaknesses of their product. 
Consequently, there is little 
reason to presume that the ad­
visory component of many deci­
sion aids contribute much in 
the way of decision suppor t 
(vs. automation). 
Fortunately, however, there 
seem to be a variety of rela­
tively simple ways to achieve 
this d i s c rimination. The 
first, and most obvious, is 
simply to promote an accurate 
mental model of the decision 
aid in the decision maker. In 
Lehner and Zirk (1987), for in­
stance, it was found that even 
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a rudimentary understanding of 
how an expert system works 
could lead to dramatic improve­
ment in performance. Alterna­
tively, one could embed within 
the decision aid itself some 
"metarules" for identifying 
contexts in which the aids ad­
vice should probably be ig­
nored. For instance, an aid 
based on a quantitative uncer­
tainty calculus might be able 
to flag situations where there 
is significant higher order un­
certainty (significant amount 
of missing data, sensitivity 
analysis indicates recommenda­
t i o n  n o t  r ob u s t , e t c .). 
Finally, one could promote, in 
decision makers, a better un­
derstanding of the human deci­
sion making process; perhaps 
making them aware of many of 
t h e  c om m o n  bi a s e s  ( e .g ., 
hindsight bias) that lead deci­
sion makers to be overconfident 
in their assessment accuracy. 
Before closing this section, it 
is worth noting that in eqs. 1 
3 we assumed that after 
rejecting the aid's advice the 
probability of generating the 
correct answer unaided is the 
s a m e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  
rejected advice was correct. 
Presumably, however, the deci­
sion maker and the aid's algo­
rithm are based on a common 
source of knowledge. One might 
P(correct l aided) = 
P(ignore aid l user correct)*P(user correct) 
+ P(advice correct l uses aid)*P{uses aid l user correct) 
*P(user correct) 
+ P(advice correct l uses aid)*P(uses aid l user wrong) 
*P(user wrong) 
FIGURE 4 
Accuracy of Decision Maker/Decision Aid Combination: Equation [3] 
("user correct" could be expanded to "user would be correct" . )  
therefore expect a positive 
correlation between the two 
problem solvers. If, however, 
the two problem-solving ap­
proaches are positively corre­
lated (e.g. , when an expert 
system is designed to mimic 
human problem solving), then 
the aided probability of suc­
cess can easily decrease. To 
illustrate this, recall the ex­
ample at the beginning of Sec­
tion 3.0 where we had 
P(accept advice ! 
advice correct) .7 
P(accept advice ! 
advice incorrect) = . 3. 
which resulted in P {correct I 
aided) = . 68. 
Now suppose we added the as­
sumption that the aid's algo­
rithm is uniformly better than 
the unaided user. For all 
problems where the unaided user 
would generate the correct 
answer, the algorithm would 
also get it right. We then add 
to our scenario: 
P(user correct ! reject advice 
& advice correct) = .6j. 7 
P(user correct l reject advice 
& advice wrong) = 0. 
Plugging these new numbers into 
eq. 2 gives us P(correct l aided) 
= . 67. 
The effect of the dependency 
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was small, but negative. More 
generally, P(correct l aided) 
decreases whenever the user is 
more likely to generate a cor­
rect answer in the same cir­
cumstances as the aid. For the 
classes of problems we explored 
the effect of dependencies of 
this type was usually small. 
The impact of such dependencies 
was therefore ignored in our 
analysis. However, this result 
does suggest that the popular 
no tion that decision aids 
should be designed to mimic 
human expert problem solving 
may be misguided. 
4.0 DISCUSSION 
To summarize. The usefulness 
of a decision aid depends on 
thea user's ability to identify 
contexts in which the aid (or 
user unaided) is likely to be 
i n c o r r e c t. W i t h o u t  t h i s  
ability, " considering" the ad­
vice of a decision aid is coun­
terproductive -- the decision 
maker would b e  b e tter off 
either routinely accepting or 
ignoring the aid's advice. The 
same result holds for any par­
tial analyses. 
We do not claim that the simple 
probability analysis presented 
here is a realistic model of 
all the subtleties of a user; 
decision aid interaction. We 
do, however, claim that it 
provides a reasonable charac-
terization of the impact of the 
variables we are examining. It 
is hard to imagine how a more 
complex model would would sug­
gest directional impacts dif­
ferent from those presented in 
this paper. 
A l s o  o f  i n t e r e s t  i s  t h e  
relationship of this analysis 
to empirical research examining 
the effectiveness of decision 
aids (see for reviews Adelman, 
in p r e s s; S h a rd a ,  et.al., 
1988). · Empirical tests have 
had mixed results -- some aids 
improve performance, others 
have little effect, and some 
decrease performance. Unfor­
tunately, most empirical ef­
forts to evaluate a decision 
a id e v a lu a t e  the aid a s  a 
whole. They do not attempt to 
discriminate the contribution 
of various components of an 
aid. In this paper we have ex­
amined the impact of various 
components analytically. our 
analysis does not suggest that 
decision aids per se are inef­
fective, but only that it is 
inappropriate to attribute ef­
fectiveness to advisory support 
provided by the aid. While a 
particular decision aid may be 
useful, that usefulness could 
be attributed to the fact that 
the aid also serves as an in­
formation system, and may also 
g e n e r a t e  a d v i c e  t h a t i s  
routinely accepted. It should 
not be assumed that the ad­
visory component, which is the 
core of most decision a ids, 
provides any useful decision 
support. Empirical research in 
this area is needed. 
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